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# Pro ## Intro Given current trends, My partner and I encourage you to vote Pro on the topic of QUOTE(resolution)[Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.]ENDQUOTE in today's debate. %%%% For clarification in the debate, we offer the following definition: ++++ Best Interest - QUOTE(def best)[For one's benefit or advantage]ENDQUOTE %%%% To further support the resolution we offer the following contention: Antimissile systems work towards diplomacy. ## A Antimissile systems increase South Korea’s ability to end conflict from a diplomatically favorable position. %%%% With the deployment of AMS, the ability to engage in favored diplomatic negotiations with South Korea grows as the North loses it’s only bargaining card. According to the NY Times QUOTE(position of strength)[An overture from the incoming Moon administration to start talks with Pyongyang should be made with caution. Engagement with North Korea has a mixed, if not poor, record, and new talks would be more effective if started from a position of strength. It is vital that Moon pursues policies to decrease his country’s vulnerability to ”attack, while dangling the possibility of talks. Beijing and Washington are key to any deal with North Korea, but Seoul can do a lot on its own.]ENDQUOTE QUOTE(south korea needs uphand)[South Korea In June 2017, President Moon said in an engagement with North Korea would only be possible when the South has the security ability to overwhelm the North, the presidential office said in a media briefing.]ENDQUOTE ## B Without the deployment of anti-missile systems to change the status quo there is no reason to believe that any negotiations will help alleviate the pressure and danger posed to South Korea. %%%% In the past without the deployment of anti-missile systems North Korea has negotiated disarmament and de escalation of its nuclear program but all previous attempts were disregarded and discarded by North Korea. QUOTE(history of violations)[In 2005 North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. Yet in July 2006 North Korea test fires long range missiles, and the UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend the program. In February of 2007 North Korea agreed to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million. But in December North Korea misses the deadline to disable its weapons.]ENDQUOTE Clearly twice North Korea has failed to uphold its end of the international agreements and have in the past escalated their nuclear weapons testing program. ## C Deployment of Antimissile systems would strengthen the US-SouthKorea alliance %%%% The fact is that with Donald Trump’s “america first strategy” puts the deployment of AMS as a way to show South Korean commitment to US-SouthKorea alliance QUOTE(erosion of american support)[The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.]ENDQUOTE Impacts that come from failing to deploy AMS means that the US has reason to question its alliance with the South Korea and it sets a dangerous precedent that China could easily influence South Korean policy by simply putting forth economic sanctions, giving China a lot of influence in South Korea which challenges the idea of South Korean sovereignty which would not be in their best interests. ## D The Impact of stronger US-SouthKorea alliance is that there is a benefit to stronger US presence in east asia. %%%% The ability for the US presence to limit chinese incursions and invoke order is East Asia allows for economic and diplomatic prosperity. The National Interest says QUOTE(us economic help)[This region is in a middle of an economic boom that has brought about tremendous wealth. --- China, Japan and South Korea are all on the list of the United States’ top ten trade partners, and in return, the three countries all have the United States included in their top-five lists. America has played a vital role in bringing about the Asian economic miracle. The presence of its armed forces in the region reduces the chance of conflict between Japan and China and prevents states like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan from seeking nuclear weapons; and enforces an open trade–based environment that binds East Asian countries together. No Asian country can take on America’s job as a regional policeman, for each lacks both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbors.]ENDQUOTE More specifically, QUOTE(us sk trade)[The US and South Korea conduct more than $100 billion in trade each year. The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement has strengthened that relationship, while affirming the shared values of free markets and fair commerce. Its importance extends well beyond economics.]ENDQUOTE ## Blocks BLOCK(South Korea needs China to continue to pressure NK with sanctions have minimal effect.)(Argument is not unique world, as China refuses to actually enforce sanctions even without AMS/or sanctions have no effect.)[QUOTE(china not following sanctions)[it took months for China to make any effort to meet last year's U.N. cap on coal imports from North Korea]ENDQUOTE]ENDBLOCK BLOCK(AMS will lead to arms race with NK, Russia, and China)(With or without AMS these nations will continue to research new armament (not unique).)[QUOTE(north korean stockpiles)[analysts estimate that North Korea has 13-21 nuclear weapons. 9 Even absent the ability to mount a weapon on a missile, Pyongyang could threaten to deliver a crude nuclear device by, for example, using miniature submarines or special operations forces, 10 At minimum, North Korea’s nuclear program has already exceeded expectations]ENDQUOTE]ENDBLOCK BLOCK(ROK needs China diplomatic relief to end war with NK)(Regardless of AMS China has vested interest in ending the conflict quickly and peacefully.)[QUOTE(china against conflict)[Nevertheless, China, for several reasons, should consider limiting any direct “retaliation and sanctions” targeting the ROK. First, Korea still holds strategic value in the full-blown competition between China and the United States over norms and institutions, escalation in South China Sea and responses to Japanese revisionism. Second, if China interferes too much with South Korean security sovereignty, its international reputation will suffer and neighboring states may increasingly see China as a threat. Third, no Chinese retaliatory action is likely to alter South Korean behavior. Fourth, non-tariff barriers have limits as tools for retaliation.]ENDQUOTE]ENDBLOCK BLOCK(AMS leads to stronger US hegemony in ROK)(To allow chinese influence to control ROK policy increases Chinese Hegemony in the region.)[QUOTE(chinese hegemony)[If China succeeds—or even appears to succeed—in blocking THAAD, it could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool against China's other trading partners. To counter this risk, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Seoul on North Korea]ENDQUOTE]ENDBLOCK CARD(resolution)[Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.]{https://www.speechanddebate.org/topics/}{}{Sep/Oct 2017}ENDCARD CARD(def deployment)[The action of bringing resources into effective action.]{Oxford Dictionary}{}{}ENDCARD CARD(def ams)[Designed as a defense against missiles]{Merriam Webster}{}{}ENDCARD CARD(def best)[For one's benefit or advantage]{Dictionary.com}{}{}ENDCARD CARD(position of strength)[An overture from the incoming Moon administration to start talks with Pyongyang should be made with caution. Engagement with North Korea has a mixed, if not poor,record, and new talks would be more effective if started from a position of strength.It is vital that Mr. Moon pursue policies to decrease his country’s vulnerability to”attack, while dangling the possibility of talks. Beijing and Washington are key to any deal with North Korea, but Seoul can do a lot on its own.]{New York Times}{Kelly, Robert}{5/9/17}ENDCARD CARD(south korea needs uphand)[South Korean President Moon Jae-in said on Friday engagement with North Korea would only be possible when the South has the security ability to overwhelm the North, the presidential office said in a media briefing. Moon made the comments during a visit to the state-run Agency for Defense Development, where he watched a test-firing of an indigenously developed ballistic missile, hours after U.S. officials said North Korea has carried out a test of a rocket engine that they believe could be for an intercontinental ballistic missile.]{Business Insider}{Kim, Christine}{6/23/17}ENDCARD CARD(history of violations)[2005 North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea say they will provide (for) energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation. 2006 July - After North Korea test fires long range missiles, the UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend the program. October - North Korea claims to have successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. The test prompts the UN Security Council to impose a broad array of sanctions. 2007 February 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million. September 30 - At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities. December 31 - North Korea misses the deadline to disable its weapons facilities by the end of the year.]{CNN}{}{September 4, 2017}ENDCARD CARD(erosion of american support)[If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.]{Council on Foreign Relations}{Snyder, Scott}{6/12/17}ENDCARD CARD(us economic help)[This region is in a middle of an economic boom that has brought about tremendous wealth, not only for Asians but also for Americans. ---- China, Japan and South Korea are all on the list of the United States’ top ten trade partners, and in return, the three countries all have the United States included in their top-five lists. Apparently, America played a vital role in bringing about the Asian economic miracle. The presence of its armed forces in the region reduces the chance of conflict between Japan and China; prevents states like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan from seeking nuclear weapons; and enforces an open trade–based environment that binds East Asian countries together. No Asian country can take on America’s job as a regional policeman, for each lacks both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbors.]{National Interest}{Vu, Khang}{}ENDCARD CARD(reasons for us help)[When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons...First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. ...In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye’s conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay.]{USKorea Institute at Johns Hopkins}{Lee, Hee}{3/2/17}ENDCARD CARD(china not following sanctions)[Meanwhile, it took months for China to make any effort to meet last year's U.N. cap on coal imports from North Korea, and there remain major questions about whether the trade figures it released publicly are truthful. Even if the figures on coal imports are accurate, they do not appear to have negatively affected the booming China-North Korea trade overall — despite frequent warnings from the Trump administration.”]{Washingtonpost}{Taylor, Adam}{Aug 7, 2017}ENDCARD CARD(north korean stockpiles)[Judging by North Korea’s plutonium and uranium stockpiles, analysts estimate that North Korea has 13-21 nuclear weapons. 9 Even absent the ability to mount a weapon on a missile, Pyongyang could threaten to deliver a crude nuclear device by, for example, using miniature submarines or special operations forces, 10 At minimum, North Korea’s nuclear program has already exceeded expectations by expanding fissile material production, working toward miniaturization, and making progress toward greater explosive yield.]{French Institute of International Relations }{Warden, John K}{March 2017}ENDCARD CARD(chinese hegemony)[If China succeeds—or even appears to succeed—in blocking THAAD, it could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool against China's other trading partners. To counter this risk, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Seoul on North Korea and work toward THAAD’s deployment, while at the same time trying to reassure China that the missile defense system does not undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. It should also look for opportunities to raise the costs of Beijing’s coercive behavior.]{foreignaffairs.com}{Glaser, Bonnie}{March 2017}ENDCARD CARD(china against conflict)[Nevertheless, China, for several reasons, should consider limiting any direct “retaliation and sanctions” targeting the ROK. First, Korea still holds strategic value in the full-blown competition between China and the United States over norms and institutions, escalation in South China Sea and responses to Japanese revisionism. Second, if China interferes too much with South Korean security sovereignty, its international reputation will suffer and neighboring states may increasingly see China as a threat. Third, no Chinese retaliatory action is likely to alter South Korean behavior. Fourth, non-tariff barriers have limits as tools for retaliation.[5] With these considerations in mind, China will respond to THAAD primarily by strengthening its military ties and cooperation with Russia, stably managing its relations with North Korea and attempting strategic negotiations with the United States. South Korea has its own reasons to limit its tensions with Beijing. Up to 25 percent of the ROK’s trade volume comes from China, and reunification of the Korean peninsula is not possible without Beijing’s constructive role in the process. Therefore, ‘China bashing’ is unrealistic and can return like a boomerang to haunt the ROK. In particular, South Korea stands to incur diplomatic costs if the region’s security dynamic changes from ‘DPRK versus the international community’ to ‘ROK-US-Japan versus China-Russia-DPRK.’]{38north.org}{HEE OK LEE}{March 2017}ENDCARD CARD(us sk trade)[The two countries conduct more than $100 billion in trade each year. Korus has strengthened that relationship, while affirming the shared values of free markets and fair commerce. Its importance extends well beyond economics]{Bloomberg}{}{April 2017}ENDCARD
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